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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBS #2203/01 1781642  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
P 271642Z JUN 06  
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2349  
INFO RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY  
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 7499

UNCLAS BRUSSELS 002203

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E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [MARR](#) [MCAAP](#) [MOPS](#) [PREL](#) [BE](#)

SUBJECT: BELGIUM: 2005/2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ALLIED  
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMON DEFENSE

REF: 2005 STATE 223383

¶1. SUMMARY: Belgium continues to provide important contributions to the common Transatlantic defense, by assisting resident and transiting U.S. forces and with its own forces supporting stability in Afghanistan, the Balkans and the Congo. The Belgian military is hobbled by an aging force structure and the fact that a dominant share of its budget is consumed by personnel costs. It is also constrained by a diminishing real budget. In 2005, the MoD was authorized to keep the proceeds of asset sales. It used these off-budget funds to supplement its transformation procurement program. Deployment spending also increased a bit, due to some efficiency in other areas, and to reduction of training, which may hurt in the medium term. The Vision 2015 project aims to reduce the total personnel strength from its current 44,000 to 39,500 by 2015. At the same time the plan seeks to reverse the ratio of combat forces to support personnel (currently estimated at 46%:54%), and reduce the average age from 36 to 33.

¶2. In 2004, Belgium was the first ally to volunteer F-16 aircraft for the air policing mission over the Baltics. In 2005, it sent a limited contingent to the UAE to train Iraqi troops alongside the Germans. It also participated for a time in EU Operation Althea in Bosnia and made a maritime deployment to Operation Enduring Freedom. For 2006, Belgium planned limited increases in Afghanistan and Congo, and a small reduction in Kosovo. Belgium continued to provide crucial support for U.S. military transit through Europe to Iraq, and made substantial contribution as host of both allied and U.S. facilities. It has committed forces to the NATO Response Force (NRF 6) and to the NRF live exercise in Cape Verde. Belgium has tried to limit the growth of NATO common funding, which must be paid by MOD out of its budget. Although the Belgian contribution to NATO has grown in this period, it will remain constrained by tight budgets. This general survey of the Belgian Military also responds to reftel -- paragraph references in parenthesis refer to paras. reftel, reformatted for narrative consistency. End Summary.

#### THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT (8.A)

¶3. Over 2004-5 Belgium renewed its Transatlantic commitment on the political level, becoming more supportive of U.S. policies, although some differences persist, particularly on NATO. The landmark visit of President Bush in February 2005 was paralleled by other high level bilaterals, including both Secretaries of Defense and State- the latter for multiple

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visits - and several Belgian ministers went to Washington. The Belgians used these high level meetings to offer forces for Afghanistan and to outline plans for participating in a German-led training program for the Iraqi military and to provide modest funding for the NATO Training Mission in Iraq.

The Belgians remained strong supporters of a European Defense, which they believe can become a bulwark of a "Two-Pillar" NATO. Marrying their transatlantic and European orientations, the Belgians proposed and eventually hosted the second of a series of informal meetings between all EU AND NATO Foreign Ministers, sometimes called "Gymnicks".

¶4. Belgium is run by a left-right coalition of four parties, Flemish and French-speaking Liberals (conservatives, including Prime Minister Verhofstadt and Foreign Minister De Gucht) and Socialists (including Minister of Defense Flahaut), which harbor differing views on defense issues and sometimes have difficulty coming to a decision, particularly where resources are involved. These contradictions are sometimes magnified by the historic strength of pacifist sentiment in Flanders, dating back to the First World War.

¶5. Belgium continues to maintain a balanced budget. This fiscal policy continues to constrain its military expenditures and hinder modernization of its military force. Fiscal austerity and innovative revenue sourcing to reduce past excessive debt enabled Belgium to achieve a balanced budget in 2005, its sixth in a row. Belgium's cumulative public debt/GDP ratio fell to 94.3 percent by the end of 2005 from 134 percent in 1999, but is still one of the highest among EU member states. The government's fiscal program aims to reduce this ratio to the EMU Target of under 66 percent. Belgium's external trade-oriented economy helped it survive the 2002-2003 global economic downturn better than other EU member states, and GDP growth in 2004 was a strong 2.4

percent.

¶6. Belgian GDP in 2005 was euro 267 billion, and real economic growth, was 1.4 percent in 2005, just at the Eurozone average rate. Inflation in Belgium remained low at 2 percent in 2005, and is not expected to rise in 2006. Belgian GDP is projected to reach about euros 273 billion in 2006, a growth of about 2 percent measured at constant prices. The exchange rate of the dollar against the euro fell in 2004 and 2005, though recovered at the end of this period. Average pooled exchange rate for 2005 used throughout this report is: \$1.20 = 1 euro All Belgian figures are Calendar Year.

#### Military Transformation (8.C)

¶7. Belgium is slowly continuing to transform its military in the face of very tight budget constraints. The MOD Strategic Plan for Defense (2015 Plan), updated in 2005, is designed to achieve a force that is smaller, more modern, flexible and deployable although also less robust. The high average age of Belgian service members continued to be the major challenge to the reform. Personnel costs increased from 59.7% of total budget in 2003 to 61.7% in 2005. The Belgians intend to address the personnel problems by recruiting more young people while moving older personnel to less costly civilian positions in the Defense Ministry, other governmental agencies and the private sector, while retiring a certain number of older soldiers. Full implementation of this plan, negotiated with the military's unions, will not occur before 2008. A reduction in force is projected to continue through 2013-2015. The MoD maintains that its reforms are working; both the age and personnel share, though still far to high, began to turn around 2005 for the first time in years. Annual budget allocations are shown below.

#### BUDGET FOR PERSONNEL, OPERATIONS, AND INVESTMENTS

2003	2004	2005	2006	Proj.2015	2006	EUROS(mn)
Personnel	59.7	60.9	61.7	60.4	52.8	1,651

Operations	28.4	26.9	25.4	25.0	25.4	683
Infrastr.	3.2	3.2	3.4	3.8	3.2	103
Investment	8.7	8.9	9.5	10.9	18.7	298
Total						2,735

¶8. The transformation of the military, refined in 2004, and increasingly put into play in 2004 and 2005, is in accord with NATO goals for a more deployable force, configured to meet the challenges of new, frequently out of area missions. For example, Belgium is giving up its tanks for a new generation of lighter armored vehicles and reducing its artillery to nothing larger than 105mm. In 2004, it restructured some units for enhanced flexibility. The transformation plan placed special emphasis on Humanitarian missions and Chapter VI peacekeeping. One consequence has been a diminution of capability in the high-end of combat, for which it has preserved roles principally for its Air Force's F-16's, land reconnaissance, and some naval specialties.

¶9. The Belgians had already embraced jointness, by formally abolishing their separate Army, Navy, and Air Force, although the services retain much of their identity (including ranks and uniforms) in the form of Land, Sea, and Air Components of the single Armed Forces. Structures such as planning and procurement are shared. Over the 2004-2005 period these changes appeared better digested. As with other militaries, many of these transformational changes have proved controversial within the ranks and in the political arena. Another result of the reorganization was the revelation of scandals and other problems buried in the old system, such as a 2004 discovery of widespread procurement fraud. Over the 2004-2005 period, internal controls appear to have increased.

#### BUDGET AND TRANSFORMATIONAL PROCUREMENT

¶10. The Belgian military budget continues to be 1% of the GDP, in line with many other Western European countries. The budget total was projected to increase from 2.59 billion euros in 2003 to 2.73 billion euros in 2006, less than the rate of inflation, but this understates their real expenditure. The budget remains a domestically contentious

issue, with one of the socialist members of the governing coalition calling for major additional cuts in military spending and complete integration of Belgian forces in a larger European force.

¶11. In 2005 the MoD got long term extension of a 2004 one-shot deal with the government and Parliament to keep the proceeds of its asset sales, including surplus real estate on the condition proceeds are used solely to buy equipment. While precise figures are not available, estimates of net proceeds for 2005 reach or exceed 30 millions, enough to produce in effect a real net increase in the military budget. The Belgian Ministry of Defense has predicated funding for parts of its transformation on such sale of excess military equipment and the conversion of property to civil uses. Belgium's creative approach to financing transformation has also included saving money by decommissioning and selling frigates, tanks, fighter aircraft and helicopters and by cuts in personnel and administrative costs. For example, Belgium is endeavoring to sell F-16s and F-16 parts, and has sold three frigates and other older equipment. As some of this equipment is U.S. origin, the asset transformation strategy sometimes depends on USG concurrence and/or cooperation.

¶12. In June 2004, the Belgian Council of Ministers approved 761 million euros for defense investment. The majority of the money was spent in transforming the land component. By the end of 2004, a 350.7 million euro (\$420 million) contract was signed for the purchase of 352 DINGO II Multi Purpose Protected Vehicles (MPPV) made by the German company Krauss-Maffei-Wegmann. In addition, 41 million euros (\$ 49 million) was spent on F-16 upgrades program. The upgrades include the Operational Flight Program Update, purchase of precision improvement sensors (JDAM,s) and the update of the

Operational Flight Trainer.

¶13. In July 2005, the Belgian Council of Ministers approved a 1.2 billion euro (\$1.44 billion) investment. The focus of the investment is on armored vehicles, but also includes two frigates and 10 NH-90 helicopters. The centerpiece of this aggressive program is the acquisition of 242 Armored Infantry Vehicles (AIVs) valued at 700 million euros or \$840 million. The Belgians expect to use the platform in several different configurations as the United States Army plans to do with the Stryker combat vehicle. On 27 January 2006, the Belgian government awarded this contract to MOWAG, a Swiss company that belongs to General Dynamics Corporation.

¶14. A second important piece of this program is the purchase of two Dutch built, M-type frigates (valued at 260 million euros \$312 million). These will replace three Belgian frigates, one of which has already been sold to Bulgaria (note: Bulgaria has taken an option out on the other two, so it's very likely they'll purchase those, also). While this represents a reduction in the number of Belgian frigates, the two Dutch built frigates are more modern, larger, and more capable than the older Belgian ships. As the Belgian Navy operates under a joint Belgian-Netherlands command, sharing similar ships will enhance interoperability. The contract between the Dutch and Belgian Ministers of Defense was signed on 22 December 2005. The delivery of the first frigate is projected for 2007; the second will follow in 2008. The third major piece of the program is the purchase of 10 NH-90 multifunctional support helicopters valued at 300 million euros or \$360 million. These will replace the aging Sea King and Alouette III helicopters.

#### Defense Policy Orientation and Operations

¶15. Already in 2004, Belgium had moved away from its earlier efforts to focus attention and resources on duplicative EU military structures and capabilities. It has nonetheless continued to support ESDP. In 2005, Belgium provided a building for EU Military Staff and its small planning core, and sent a small number of personnel to the EU logistic mission in support of AU peacekeeping in Darfur (not to the parallel NATO effort). The focus was more as a complement to NATO than, as previously, an alternative. It plans to supply forces to the newly-organized EU battle groups, as well as NRF.

#### GRANT AID, PKO, NONPROLIFERATION (12)

¶16. Nonproliferation: In 2004, Belgium sent a frigate to join Operation Active Endeavor, a NATO counterterrorism deployment in the Mediterranean, which has also acquired a counterproliferation mission. Politically, Belgium has worked in the IAEA Board of Governors to block proliferation efforts of Iran, and has instituted tight export control policies. It also agreed to support the Proliferation Security Initiative and has participated in PSI exercises in Northwest Europe. Military involvement has so far been limited.

#### CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (12.A)

¶17. Belgian forces, coordinated through the MFA-led interagency Belgian First Aid and Support Team (B-FAST) take an active role in disaster mitigation around the world. They were deployed in 2004 to Morocco for Earthquake relief and in 2005 participated in Tsunami relief efforts, particularly in Sri Lanka. Belgium was one of the first international responders to Hurricane Katrina; they sent a small medical and logistics team to the U.S. Gulf coast within days of the disaster.

#### MILITARY ASSISTANCE (12 B)

#### PEACEKEEPING AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES (12.C)

¶18. Limited deployments in support of UN operations are sometimes reimbursed. The Defense Ministry is striving to keep out-of-country deployments, which are almost exclusively for PHO or related training programs, below a total of 1,000 personnel, principally for budgetary reasons. The Minister of Defense has stated that he has sufficient funding to deploy 500 soldiers for a year or 1,000 for six months. However, actual deployments during 2004-2005 have usually ranged closer to 1,000 than 500. Post estimates average deployment in 2005 may exceeded 800; slightly above 2004 and a significant increase over 2002-2003, which were under 600. Deployments of more costly assets such as ships or aircraft must come from the total deployment budget. In 2005, Belgium rationalized its former deployments, withdrawing a tiny contingent from Cambodia and reducing participation in UN Mideast missions.

¶19. Most costs for Peacekeeping Operations are covered in the MOD budget. In the cases of deployments in support of UN operations, operating costs are sometimes borne by the UN. Other UN and multilateral operations and some others, such as the Belgian First Aid Support Team (B-FAST) receive budget support from other elements of the Belgian government, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The MFA financed most of the cost of deployment of the B-FAST for humanitarian assistance following a earthquake in Morocco, and for the deployment o New Orleans.

¶20. AFGHANISTAN: Belgian roops provided security at Kabul Internationa Airport throughout the period. In addition, when Eurocorps took over ISAF lead in 2005, Belgium doubled its contingent to over 600 troops, providing additional headquarters staffing, an 8-person Intelligence cell and a maneuver company which patrolled Kabul North. In addition, it deployed 4 F-16's to Kabul along with a C-130 transport and support personnel, whose deployment was extended through the period of the Parliamentary elections. These additional deployments departed by the end of 2005, bringing the force level back to about 300. Belgium provided up to 40 personnel to the German-led PRT in Konduz, in Northern Afghanistan and offered 2 personnel as part of ISAF command north, in Mazar-i-Sharif. The Belgian government decided in December 2005 to provide at least an additional 40 troops and a C-130 in 2006, with the possibility of additional deployments up to the level deployed for Eurocorps under study.

¶21. BALKANS: Belgium maintained, but reduced its presence in the Balkans. At the end of 2005, the majority of personnel (220) were assigned to BELMOKOS (Belgium-Luxembourg-Mongolia) in Kosovo, part of KFOR. The numbers were projected to drop to about 180 in 2006. The Belgians also served in the EU mission in Macedonia, which closed out in 2005. Belgium was represented in a number of Balkan missions, including serving in KFOR/SFOR and joint headquarters positions. Belgium also supported the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) with 4 personnel (funded outside the defense budget). In 2005 Belgium participated in

the EU Operation ALTHEA with 4 helicopters and 47 personnel as part of MNTF-N, along with 53 personnel in a UAV squadron.

These were withdrawn in November 2005, reflecting the seasonal lull in operations, but were expected to at least partially redeploy during 2006.

¶22. ASIA: The modest Belgian deployments in Asia changed over this period. Small demining support elements of under a dozen in total in Laos and Cambodia were phasing out. Belgium deployed 4 personnel to the EU mission monitoring the Aceh peace settlement. From much of 2005 there was a detachment of some 75 personnel in Sri Lanka doing Tsunami relief. Token participation in the India-Pakistan-Kashmir UN observer mission (UNMOGIP) was due to terminate in 2006.

¶23. MIDDLE EAST: Belgium made a symbolically significant, but modest 9-person deployment to train Iraqi military in the UAE, under the aegis of a German training mission. In 2004, Belgium offered to provide a C-130 to the UN for use in and around Iraq. The U.N. didnot respond to the offer until



late 2005, by which time maintenance shortfalls and other deployment commitments forced the Belgians to temporarily suspend the offer, a situation not expected to change at least through 2006. Belgian reduced to two the number of military personnel serving with the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), in which Belgium has been involved since 1948.

¶24. AFRICA: Belgium remained active promoting peace and stability, principally in its former colonies in Central Africa. Belgium maintains a small contingent working with the military in Burundi. Belgium has a token number of personnel assigned to MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (see under training). Belgium also planned a modest participation in the EU elections support mission in ¶2006.

¶25. A few Belgian peacekeepers have been deployed as observers in Sudan's Nuba Mountains, while several Belgian military logisticians are engaged in the EU 's effort to support the AU mission in Darfur. Its long-term effort in Benin paid off in increased peacekeeping activities by the Benin forces, in Cote d'Ivoire and DR Congo. Belgium has played a central supportive role in the African Crisis Response Initiative and is examining its potential role in the U.S. African Contingency Operations Training Assistance program (ACOTA). Belgium has also set up a small detachment of military security personnel for its diplomatic missions in the region.

#### CURRENT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (12.D)

¶26. None.

#### CAPACITY BUILDING GRANT AID (12.D)

¶27. None outside the OECD guidelines.

#### TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE (12.E)

¶28. DRC: Belgium remained a leader in security sector reform in the DRC through most of 2004-2005, in coordination with the EU. Its priority was providing bilateral and mobilizing multilateral support for training the DRC integrated Brigades. In 2005, Belgium established a training center and trained the first joint brigade, co-training the second with South Africa and coordinating a third brigade trained by Angola. In January and February Belgian military personnel trained 250 additional Congolese cadre in Kinshasa. These cadre were to become instructors for training additional brigades. It also conducted a train-the-trainer program for Congolese mostly NCO's in Belgium, and followed up in Congo. Despite logistic and other problems, the first brigade has performed relatively well and the other brigades have also been a success. From February to May, in conjunction with the South African Military, The Belgians conducted refresher training for the 3rd Integrated Brigade in Kamina. Throughout the year, the Belgians continued to work with the Congolese military authorities on strategic planning, personnel administration, budgeting and finance, training, and force structure. The Belgians also provided significant logistic support to the Congo Army, particularly in-kind donations of military equipment. Belgium provided the DRC

military with an FSB bridge and associated training. The bridge will be used by the DRC to support UN humanitarian programs.

¶29. Benin: Belgium's long-term program of military assistance and training with Benin began to yield payoffs. Belgium supported the participation, including with logistics of Beninois soldiers in the UN Ivory Coast peacekeeping Mission (supported by two Belgian liaison officers). It also trained and equipped a Benin battalion to participate in the UN peacekeeping force in Congo, MONUC. Additionally, over one hundred Benin soldiers were enrolled in Belgian schools, along with numerous soldiers from other francophone African

counties. The bulk of program costs for the efforts in Benin comes from Belgium's military budget. In 2005, Belgian Engineers assisted the Benin military with several humanitarian renovation and reconstruction projects.

#### NATO ISSUES (13)

¶30. Belgium has continued to place a priority on support of NATO efforts. It launched the successful air policing of the newly accessioned Baltic states in 2004, and was preparing for a second deployment in 2006. It participated at end 2005 in a maritime mine clearance/exercise in the Baltic Sea. It participated in Operation Active Endeavor, with 160 sailors from October-December 2005. It continues to maintain NATO-dedicated F-16 squadrons, although it has reduced the number of aircraft. As noted above and has participated in NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan throughout the period of this report. It has also participated in NATO exercises. The Belgian Military has committed a relatively substantial component (ground and air) to the next rotation of the NATO Response Force 7(NRF7)with some forces also assigned for NRF8.

¶31. Belgium has also provided agreed common funding, including for NATO Training Mission in Iraq, although budget constraints have led it to seek wherever possible to minimize such demands on its resources. As common funding now comes directly from the military budget, increased NATO assessments mean reduced transformational procurements or operations. In addition, complicated political and budgetary decision-making linked to the four-party left-center right coalition have meant that responses on these issues sometimes require extra time, on funding for Iraq, for example. Belgium, however, ultimately always has agreed to and provided the required funding.

#### PROSPECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO PfP and NATO OUTREACH (13.A/B)

¶32. Belgium sold a used frigate to Bulgaria, which is considering purchasing the other two Belgian frigates. It has offered to sell excess F-16's to Jordan or Romania, and was prepared to "mentor" any Air Force it supplies. Belgium's limited means otherwise restrain any potential contribution. Belgium's direct contribution to PfP has been limited to its share of NATO costs. Belgium attempts to maximize its impact and limited budget through bilateral exercises conducted in the spirit of PfP with like-sized states. By the end of 2005, it was moving to expand considerably its engagement with partners in Ukraine, Moldova, the Caucasus and Central Asia due to its 2006 Chairmanship of the OSCE. Belgium is not significantly engaged in the Mediterranean Dialogue (but participates in parallel EU efforts) or ICI.

#### CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMON DEFENSE

Cost Sharing (Reftel Para 9).

¶33. The Government of Belgium does not provide direct financial contribution to the United States. However, there are a variety of in-kind contributions, as noted below.

¶34. Direct Cost Sharing (Para. 10)

¶A. Rents. Belgium continues to support the United States by providing, free of charge, the land and facilities occupied by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Chievres Air Base (SHAPE,s support base), the Daumerie Caserne (Headquarters for the United States Army Garrison BENELUX) and Chateau Gendebien, the residence of the Commander of SHAPE and, finally, the support facilities for

the 52d (USAF) Munitions Squadron at Kleine Brogel Air Base. In addition, Belgium provides the land for NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and is supplying additional land for a new Headquarters complex adjacent to the current site. The Belgian military continued to provide a very low cost solution for a life support area at a military installation

near Antwerp while the United States Army conducted logistics movements to and from the Central Europe/Persian Gulf Region through the port.

Non-leased building space provided by the Belgian government for the use of US forces varied insignificantly from the FY 03 report. Total space provided amounted to 1,062,837 square feet. The rate assumed to be in effect is still USD 8.50 per square foot resulting in a savings to the USG of \$9,034,114. Non-leased land provided by the Belgian government amounted to 1,342 acres at a rate of 0.2965 per square foot. This equals an approximate cost of \$95.19 per acre. Total estimated savings for the USG government amounted to \$9,161,859. With real estate costs in Belgium escalating rapidly (5-10%/year), actual savings may be much higher.

B. LABOR: Additionally the Belgian government provided significant support throughout FY 04 and FY 05 to Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom by providing security support for Fort-to-Port operations at the Port of Antwerp. This is in line with the support that Belgium has consistently provided since 2002. The U.S. contracted and reimbursed Belgium through military to military contracts for the amount of 517,943 euros (\$621,543). This support was provided under the Acquisition and Servicing Agreement between Belgium and the United States. The estimated average hourly rate for this support comes to 6.25 euros. However, the U.S. (in line with previous years) received more support than what was billed. The Belgian MOD often provided support without charge ) when feasible. Examples include police and fire support to U.S. port operations, relieving U.S. forces of the requirement to do that vital mission.

C. KATUSA Labor. Not applicable.

D. The United States paid \$2,161,061 for utilities to support its activities in Brussels and at Chievres AB during FY 05. This is an increase of \$40,470 from FY 03. The total increase in costs is less than two percent over the last two fiscal years.

E. Facilities Planning and Design. No significant changes since FY 03.

F. Facilities Improvement Program. Belgium does not participate in the funding of maintenance, construction or renovation projects. However, the Belgian government has had a flexible requirement that the United States, for certain high cost projects, conduct the contracting through their offices, which charge a fee to do so.

G. Relocation and Construction. No significant changes since FY 03.

H. Vicinity Improvement. Nothing significant to report.

35. Indirect Cost Sharing. (Para. 11)

A. Rents. The USG/DOD continues to pay for many market rate leases both in Brussels and in Chievres in support of SHAPE and the three embassies. The details of the amount of square footage leased were not available for this report. However, Operations and Maintenance funds and Army Family Housing funds paid a total of \$7,095,194 during FY 05 for these leases. This is a decrease of \$271,768 from FY 03,s report.

B. TAX CONCESSIONS. Belgium applies an uneven approach to tax relief, due in part to the competing goals of the various Belgian government ministries. US personnel continue to pay Value Added Tax on many services and utilities (electricity, fuel oil), increasing the cost to the individual by 21 percent. Belgian tax authorities continue their attempts to impose a tax on services provided by local vendors on military bases, but have not done so. The previously unlimited ability to purchase tax free vehicles has been changed to allow service members to purchase only one vehicle per tour. The Belgian Ministry of Defense continues to push



for an indirect contracting process for US construction projects, under which their internal contracting division would contract on the US Forces' behalf for all construction needs, in return for a 3-5% administrative fee.

The above concerns are counterbalanced in large part by the Belgian authorities' uniformly favorable response to US requests for relief in certain areas. For example, the Belgian government routinely waives visa, work permit, and taxation requirements for US contractor personnel who work solely for the US Forces on certain types of contracts. This results in a substantial cost-savings for the US Forces, since it keeps contract prices artificially low. In addition, Belgium continues to provide VAT tax relief for military operations on contracts for materials, supplies, services, and for the purchase of petroleum, oil, and lubricants. U.S. forces have full access to the APO postal services, representing significant foregone revenue to the Belgian government.

¶37. Additional information, including a map showing worldwide deployment of Belgian forces is available on Embassy Brussels SIPRNET website in the POL/MIL folder, Reporting and Analysis portal--:  
[www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/brussels/index.cfm](http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/brussels/index.cfm)

POC

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¶38. POCs are Political-Military Officer Craig Karp; Col. John Gagnon, Defense Attache; and LTC Andrew Johnson, Office of Defense Cooperation. Karp email: [karpcm@state.gov](mailto:karpcm@state.gov). All can be reached via embassy switchboard: 322-508-2111.  
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